

Message Text

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TO AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

S E C R E T STATE 226565

FOLLOWING 101731Z SENT INFO SECSTATE CSAF CSA
INFO ALL SHIPS COPYING LMCC BDCST NOSIC SUTLAND
USS INDEPENDENCE USS SARATOGA USS DWIGHT D EISENHOWER USS
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CIG SIX NINE PT SEVEN AIRANISUBRUN THREE ONE
COMCRUDESGRU EIGHT SEPTEMBER 10; REPEATED TO YOU QUOTE

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THIS SUMMARY CONTAINS SIX ITEMS:

ITEM 1: CUBA: WILL NOT RAISE ISSUE OF PUERTO RICO AT U.N.

ITEM 2: VENEZUELA: NEW SECURITY AND DEFENSE LAW

ITEM 3: PORTUGAL: NEW ECONOMIC MEASURES

ITEM 4: EGYPT: OPTIONS FOR ATTACK ON LIBYA

ITEM 5: LEBANON: SITUATION REPORT

ITEM 6: JAPAN: FRICTION MOUNTS BETWEEN USSR AND JAPAN

1. CUBA: WILL NOT RAISE ISSUE OF PUERTO RICO AT U.N.

CUBA WILL NOT RAISE THE ISSUE OF PUERTO RICAN INDEPENDENCE
AT THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY SESSION THIS MONTH. ANTICIPATING
DEFEAT ON THEIR RESOLUTION, THE CUBANS INSTEAD AGREED TO A
NORWEGIAN PROPOSAL WHICH WOULD HAVE A U.N. INVESTIGATOR REVIEW

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A 1974 COMMITTEE REPORT ON PUERTO RICO. THE CUBANS PROBABLY

HOPE THAT SINCE THE UPDATING OF THE REPORT WILL BE ASSIGNED TO SYRIA--A RELATIVELY RADICAL COMMITTEE MEMBER--THERE WILL BE AN OPPORTUNITY TO RENEW ATTACKS ON U.S. ADMINISTRATION OF THE ISLAND AND A POSSIBILITY OF GETTING A CONDEMNATORY REPORT.
(CONFIDENTIAL//CIA//BRIEFED)

2. VENEZUELA: NEW SECURITY AND DEFENSE LAW

THE SECURITY AND DEFENSE LAW, PASSED THE END OF AUGUST, GIVES PRESIDENT PEREZ NEW POWERS TO SEIZE PROPERTY, ARBITRARILY MOVE ALIEN RESIDENTS, AND USE NATIONAL TROOPS TO BREAK STRIKES. ALTHOUGH PEREZ IS CONCERNED THAT OPPOSITION ELEMENTS MAY ATTEMPT TO WEAKEN THE GOVERNMENT THROUGH SUBVERSIVE ACTIONS, HE PLANS TO USE THE LAW SPARINGLY. REACTION TO THE LAW HAS COME FROM LEFTIST POLITICAL PARTIES, JOURNALISTS, AND SOME LABOR LEADERS WHO FEAR EXECUTIVE POWER MAY INTERFERE IN LABOR RELATIONS AND DENY FREEDOM OF THE PRESS.

(SECRET//NOFORN//DIA)

3. PORTUGAL: NEW ECONOMIC MEASURES

ON 9 SEPTEMBER, PORTUGUESE PRIME MINISTER SOARES ANNOUNCED NEW STABILIZATION MEASURES HE SAID WOULD HELP SAVE THE COUNTRY FROM ECONOMIC COLLAPSE. THESE MEASURES ARE: TO REDUCE PORTUGAL'S BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS DEFICIT BY INCREASING TAXES ON IMPORTS, BANNING IMPORTS OF LUXURY GOODS, AND BOOSTING EXPORTS THROUGH SPECIAL CREDITS; TO CURB INFLATION BY SETTING UP A WAGE AND PRICE COMMISSION AND BY HOLDING DOWN PRICES ON ESSENTIAL GOODS; TO FIGHT UNEMPLOYMENT BY SHARPLY INCREASED PUBLIC WORKS SPENDING, AND BY PROHIBITING WORKERS FROM HOLDING MORE THAN ONE JOB; TO RESTORE LABOR DISCIPLINE AND STIMULATE PRODUCTIVITY BY BANNING POLITICAL MEETINGS ON THE JOB, LIMITING STRIKES, AND DENYING WAGES TO STRIKING WORKERS; AND TO REVERSE THE ILLEGAL SEIZURE OF FARMLAND. SOARES STATED THAT 80 PERCENT OF PORTUGAL'S GOLD AND FOREIGN CURRENCY RESERVES HAD BEEN EXHAUSTED SINCE THE 1974 COUP. HE IS COUNTING ON HIS NEW PROGRAM ATTRACTING MORE FOREIGN LOANS, ESPECIALLY FROM THE UNITED STATES. HIS DECISION TO TAKE THE TOUGH LINE ADVOCATED BY MORE CONSERVATIVE ADVISERS WILL PROBABLY PLEASE MOST PORTUGUESE WHO APPEAR WILLING TO ACCEPT SOME SACRIFICE AS THE PRICE FOR ENDING THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CHAOS OF THE PAST 2 YEARS. THE COMMUNISTS CAN BE EXPECTED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF WHATEVER UNFAVORABLE WORKER REACTION THERE MIGHT BE TO THE MEASURES.

(CONFIDENTIAL//CIA)

4. EGYPT: OPTIONS FOR ATTACK ON LIBYA

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THE EGYPTIANS MAY BE CONSIDERING A SMALL-SCALE ATTACK ON LIBYAN SABOTEUR TRAINING BASES. SUCH AN ACTION WOULD PROVIDE A DRAMATIC WARNING TO QADHAFI AND, IF SUCCESSFUL, MIGHT SERVE TO INCREASE DISSATISFACTION AMONG THE LIBYAN MILITARY. AN ATTACK SUCH AS THIS WOULD NOT DIRECTLY SERVE EGYPT'S PRINCIPLE AIM OF OUSTING QADHAFI, HOWEVER, AND IT IS UNLIKELY THAT EGYPT WOULD THUS LIMIT ITS ACTION.

CAIRO MAY HAVE IN MIND A COMMANDO RAID ON TRIPOLI THAT WOULD

REMOVE QADHAFI AND INSTALL A SUCCESSOR ACCEPTABLE TO THE EGYPTIANS. AS MANY AS 250,000 EGYPTIANS ARE EMPLOYED IN LIBYA, AND THERE ARE UNDOUBTEDLY A NUMBER OF INTELLIGENCE AGENTS AMONG THEM WHO COULD PINPOINT QADHAFI'S LOCATION FOR THE RAID. A RAID COULD HAVE THE ADVANTAGES OF SPEED AND SURPRISE, BUT COULD BE SUICIDAL AND UNSUPPORTABLE. IF UNDERTAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH A FULL-SCALE INVASION IN EASTERN LIBYA, A SUCCESSFUL RAID WOULD PREVENT QADHAFI FROM RALLYING SUPPORT, AND COULD THUS LIMIT RESISTANCE TO EGYPTIAN FORCES MOVING FROM THE EAST. EGYPT COULD ALSO BE CONSIDERING A CONVENTIONAL MILITARY ATTACK FROM THE EAST. EGYPTIAN FORCES WOULD PROBABLY INITIALLY ESTABLISH AIR AND GROUND SUPERIORITY OVER LIBYAN FORCES IN THE EAST. THEY WOULD LATER RISK BECOMING BOGGED DOWN BECAUSE OF OVERSTRETCHED SUPPLY LINES AND INCREASED RESISTANCE IF THEY ATTEMPTED TO ADVANCE FURTHER TO THE WEST.

MOST EGYPTIANS WOULD PROBABLY SUPPORT ANY ACTION TO OUST QADHAFI, AND THERE HAVE BEEN RECENTLY INCREASING PRESSURES ON THE GOVERNMENT TO MOVE QUICKLY. NO ARAB LEADER WOULD REGRET THE DEPARTURE OF QADHAFI, AND PROBABLY NO ARAB STATE WOULD COME TO LIBYA'S ASSISTANCE IN THE EVENT OF AN EGYPTIAN ATTACK. AT THE SAME TIME, FEW ARAB STATES WOULD OPENLY CHEER AN EGYPTIAN MOVE AGAINST LIBYA. EGYPT WOULD HAVE SOME TROUBLE RATIONALIZING INTERVENTION AGAINST LIBYA AT A TIME WHEN IT IS ITSELF VEHEMENTLY DENOUNCING SYRIA'S INTERVENTION IN LEBANON.

(SECRET//DIA)

5. LEBANON: SITUATION REPORT

THE PRINCIPLE LEBANESE CHRISTIAN LEADERS HAVE COMPLETED THEIR TALKS WITH SYRIAN PRESIDENT ASAD. NO DETAILS ON THE TALKS ARE YET AVAILABLE, BUT THE TWO SIDES APPEAR TO HAVE AGREED TO POSTPONE ANY POLITICAL OR MILITARY INITIATIVES UNTIL AFTER THE TRANSFER OF POWER TO PRESIDENT-ELECT SARKIS ON 23 SEPTEMBER. (CONFIDENTIAL//CIA//BRIEFED)

6. JAPAN: FRICTION MOUNTS BETWEEN USSR AND JAPAN

FRICTION BETWEEN TOKYO AND MOSCOW HAS BEGUN TO MOUNT OVER
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THE HANDLING OF THE MIG-25 INCIDENT. ON 9 SEPTEMBER, THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR DELIVERED A HARSHLY WORDED WRITTEN PROTEST TO THE JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTRY. AMONG OTHER THINGS THE PROTEST: NOTED THAT JAPAN HAD NOT YET REPLIED TO REPEATED SOVIET DEMANDS FOR PROMPT RETURN OF THE PILOT AND THE PLANE; TERMED LT. BELENKO'S ARRIVAL IN JAPAN THE RESULT OF AN EMERGENCY LANDING, AND HIS REQUEST FOR ASYLUM A JAPANESE FABRICATION; ACCUSED JAPANESE AUTHORITIES OF FORCIBLY MOVING BELENKO TO TOKYO; AND DESCRIBED JAPANESE ACTIONS AS UNFRIENDLY TO THE SOVIET UNION.

IN RESPONSE, THE FOREIGN MINISTRY REMINDED THE AMBASSADOR THAT TOKYO WANTED A SATISFACTORY EXPLANATION OF THE VIOLATION OF JAPAN'S TERRITORIAL AIRSPACE. THE JAPANESE PRESS HAS ALREADY BEGUN TO STRESS THE THEME THAT SUCH A VIOLATION MAKES IT IMPERATIVE FOR MOSCOW TO TAKE A CONCILIATORY ATTITUDE BEFORE NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN OVER THE RETURN OF THE PLANE. A FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN ALSO

HAS BEEN QUOTED AS SAYING THAT ONCE TALKS WITH THE SOVIETS ARE UNDERWAY, THE PLANE PROBABLY COULD BE RETURNED IN ABOUT A MONTH.

MEANWHILE, THE JAPANESE AIR SELF DEFENSE FORCE IS CONSIDERING MOVING THE AIRCRAFT FROM HAKODATE AS A PRECAUTIONARY DEFENSE MEASURE. THEY'RE CONCERED ABOUT POSSIBLE SOVIET ACTION AGAINST THE AIRCRAFT, AND HAVE PLACED AIR, GROUND, AND NAVAL UNITS IN THE VICINITY OF HAKODATE ON AN UP-GRADED ALERT STATUS.

(SECRET/NOFORN//VARIOUS//BRIEFED)

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